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Nor was the Senate correct in concluding that an amend-
ment was necessary to rectify this situation. Even assuming
the prior rulings were in point in the present instance, the
Senate's position requiring amendment is unsound as a means
of remedying the defective rule. The proper method would be
to allow the Chair to exercise its prerogative to overruling
the decisions of clearly erroneous interpretations. 29  This
would be in accord with a well recognized exception to the
doctrine of Stare Decisis-interpretations as precedent which
defeat the very purpose of the rules and are plainly wrong
should be freely overruled.30
In finding prior rulings binding on the Chair the Senate
erred, and in requiring amendment to erase previous errone-
ous interpretations the Senate sacrificed the principles of
parliamentary law in favor of political expediency.
TAXATION
TRANSFERS INTENDED TO TAKE EFFECT
AT OR AFTER DEATH
In the recent case of Spiegel's Estate v. Comm'r, 335
U. S. 701 (1949), the United States Supreme Court held
that application of the "intended to take effect at ... death"
provision of § 811 (c) 1 of the Internal Revenue Code to an
29. Senator Vandenberg expresses the opposition to such a proposal:
"If the Senate wishes to cure this impotence it has the authority, the
power, and the means to do so. The President pro tempore of the Senate
does not have the authority, the power or the means to do so except as
he arbitrarily takes the law into his own hands." 94 CONG. REC. 9753
(Aug. 2, 1948).
For reference to the powers and duties of the Chair see: WLLOUGH-
BY, Op. cit. supra note 8 at 532; LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE, chs. XIX
and XX (1922); CUSHING, .p. cit. supra note 8, at pp. 110-115, 567-572;
HATCH & SHOUP, A HISTORY OF THE VICE-PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED
STATES ch. VI (1934); GILFRY, PRECEDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
SENATE, p. 448 (1909).
Examples of other "constructive rulings," where the Chair followed
principles of policy rather than precedent, see 55 CONG. REC. 2436 (1919),
and WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 8 at 482; VIII CANNON, op. iLt.
supra note 11, at § 2424.
See also VI CANNON, op. cit. supra note 11, at § 48, where the Chair
followed precedent although he could find no intrinsic reason for sustain-
ing the point of order.
30. WELL, RES ADJUDICATA AND STARE DECISIS, ch. XLV and p. 545
(1878); BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT, p. 199 (1912).
1. "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property... to the
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irrevocable trust resulted in the imposition of an estate tax
where there was no provision for an ultimate gift over should
the beneficiaries predecease the grantor. That this possi-
bility of reverter retained by the grantor was extremely re-
mote was dismissed as insignificant.2
An ever prevalent problem posed by § 811 (c) and one
with which the Court has struggled for many years is
whether an interest which takes effect in possession or en-
joyment at or after the transferror's death, without more, is
sufficient to subject the entire transferred property to a tax
imposed upon the transferror's estate?
Early decisions established the proposition that some-
thing must pass to the beneficiaries from the transferror at
his death, thus compelling the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to attack inter vivos trusts on the theory that the
grantor had retained an interest in the transferred property.3
Helvering v. Hallock4 introduced a broader view of retained
interests when the Court held that a possibility of reverter
expressly reserved to the grantor by the terms of the con-
veying instrument was a sufficient retained interest to bring
the property within the gross estate. The Court overruled
prior cases drawing distinctions as to the character of the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, or of
which he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, under
which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death: (1) the possession, enjoyment of, or the
right to the income from or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunc-
tion, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or income therefrom."
2. The income from the trust was to be paid, during Spiegel's life-
time, equally to his three children, and if any of them should predecease
him, to their issue or, if no issue, to the surviving children and their
descendants. Upon Spiegel's death the trust was to terminate and the
corpus was to be distributed in the same manner as was the income.
Spiegel was survived by his three children and by three grandchildren.
3. Reinecke v. Northern Trust, 278 U. S. 339 (1929). The Court
declared: "... . we think it at least doubtful whether the trusts ... in-
tended to be reached by the phrase ... include any others than those
passing from the possession, enjoyment, or control of the donor at or
after his death. .. ." And the Court cited Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S.
545 (1927). In that case the trustee, under a trust executed in 1921, was
to accumulate the income until 1951, then distribute the principal to the
grantor's children. There the Court said: "Of course, it was not argued
that every vested interest that manifestly would take effect in actual
enjoyment after the grantor's death was within the statue. There
certainly is no transfer taking effect after his death to be taxed under
(thb statute)."
4. 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
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proprietary interest retained and declared that taxation
should no longer be contingent upon the "casuistries of
property law."' 5  In this latest case, Spiegel's interest was
said to be retained under Illinois law rather than by the
conveying instrument. The primary issues raised were:
Does the Hallock doctrine extend to trusts under which there
is no express retention of interest by the grantor? If so,
did Spiegel retain an interest under Illinois law? The Tax
Court, in a none too explicit memorandum decision, appar-
ently relied upon the remoteness of Spiegel's interest in or-
dering a refund.6 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that Spiegel retained an interest in the
transferred property under Illinois law.7  In affirming this
holding, the Supreme Court ruled that the Hallock doctrine
extended to this type of retained interest which resulted from
a reasonable construction of the Illinois law. Spiegel was
also held to have intended the consequences effected by the
conveying terminology, regardless of his actual intention.
Indications of a far more expansive construction of § 811
(c) in the future were found in the broad declaration of the
majority that the grantor must have ". . . no possible rever-
sionary interest in that title .... Any requirement less than
that which we have outlined .... would partially impair the
effectiveness of the 'possession and enjoyment' provision as
an instrument to frustrate estate tax evasions." 8
5. Earlier, in May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238 (1930), the Court had
held that a reservation of a life income was not a sufficient retained
interest to subject the transferred property to an estate tax. A Con-
gressional Resolution of 1931 declared that such a retention would be
sufficient, and the case was overruled in Estate of Church v. Comm'r,
335 U. S. 632 (1949), a companion case to Spiegel. After the legislative
rebuke, the Court found a taxable interest retained in Klein v. Uni-
ted States, 283 U. S. 231 (1931), where the grantor conveyed a re-
mainder contingent upon the beneficiary surviving him. But in Helver-
ing v. St. Louis Union Trust Cb., 296 U. S. 39 (1935), where the
grantor conveyed a vested remainder subject to divesture, the Court
distinguished the Klein trust, and held there was no taxable interest
retained by the grantor. This case was overruled in Hallock.
6. 4 T. C. M. 256 (1945).
7. 159 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1946). The Court declared the re-
mainders to Spiegel's children to be contingent, relying on several
Illinois cases. But the estate cited strong authority supporting its
contention that the remainders were vested under Illinois law. See,
Lachenmyer v. Gehlback, 266 Ill. 11 (1914); Murphy v. Westhoff, 386
Ill. 136 (1944); Wyeth v. Crane, 342 Ill. 545 (1931). Also, see Justice
Burton's dissent, 69 Sup. Ct. 301, 310 (1949).
8. This language indicates that the mere retention of interest
by the grantor will be sufficient to'allow the imposition of the tax,
and that it may not be required that the beneficiaries must necessarily
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In the period between Hallocc and Spiegel the litigation
and regulation under § 811(c) unfolded in a pattern of con-
fusion and seeming inconsistency.. The problem centered
upon how far Hallock was to be extended. The Commissioner
promulgated Treasury Regulation 105, § 81.17, which pro-
vided that a transfer would be intended to take effect at
death if the two following requisites were present: (1) pos-
session of the transferred interest could be obtained only by
beneficiaries who must survive the decedent, and (2) the
decedent or his estate possessed any right or interest in the
property (whether arising by the terms of the instrument or
otherwise). This second qualification was construed by
the Commissioner to include reversions by operation of law,9
but the courts did not achieve uniform construction. The Tax
Court and some of the lower federal courts began to draw
a line between proximate and remote retained interests,10
but this possible limitation to Hallock was rejected when the
Supreme Court, in Field v. United States,1 held remoteness
to be of no import. Despite this decision, some of the lower
courts continued to distinguish between propinquity and re-
moteness of rdtained interests1 2 while others predicated Hal-
lock limitations upon views either that, in the case of
implied reversions, there is no intent within the statute,13 or
that there has been no interest retained by the grantor.14
survive the grantor to take their estate. Justice Burton dissented on
the ground that Spiegel retained no interest under Illinois law, and
that he had no intention that the transfer take effect at his death.
Justice Frankfurter declared that the thread tying the grantor to
the transferred property was too thin to render the property taxable.
9. T. R. 105, § 81.17, as amended by T. D. 5512, May 1, 1946:
Example 7.
10. Estate of Joseph K. Cass, 3 T. C. 562 (1944); Francis Biddle
Trust, 3 T. C. 832 (1944); Estate of Henry S. Downe, 2 T. C. 967(1943); Estate of Goodyear, 2 T. C. 885 (1943); Comn'r v. Kellogg,
119 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1944); Lloyd's Estate v. Comm'r, 141 F.2d 758(3d Cir. 1944). The difficulty introduced by these decisions is de-
tailed in PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION, § 7.23 (1946
Supp.). And see Creamer, Reversions, Resulting Trusts and the Es-
tate Tax, 19 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 305 (1947).
11. 324 U. S. 113 (1945). Both in this case and in Fidelity-Phila-
delphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U. S. 108 (1945) the Court also
ruled that the estate tax was based upon the value of the property to
which the possibility of reverter relates and not upon the value of the
reversion.
12. Fifth Ave. Bank of N.Y. v. Comm'r, 59 F. Supp. 753 (1945).
13. Friedman v. Comm'r, 8 T. C. 68 (1947).
14. Estate of Edward P. Hughes, 7 T. C. 1348 (1948); Friedman
v. Comm'r, 8 T. C. 68 (1947).
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However, the Spiegel ruling has been heralded by other de-
cisions which reasoned that the statute, as clarified by the
regulation, included implied as well as express reversions, 15
that there is no distinction between express and implied
reversions,16 that estates are taxed where the inter vivos dis-
position is too much akin to a testamentary distribution,"7
and that the practical impossibility of reverter is only one,
and not a controlling, consideration.-
Despite the emphasis placed by the lower courts upon
the potency of the "string" retained by the grantor, it may
be that many of these decisions can be reconciled under the
first qualification of the treasury regulation.'9 The appar-
15. Bank of California v. Comm'r, 155 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1946).
16. Comm'r v. Bayne, 155 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1946); Leaman v.
Comm'r, 5 T. C. 699 (1945).
17. Central Hanover Bank v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 497 (1944).
18. Id.
19. It appears that many of the lower federal court decisions maybe reconciled under the first qualification. Those transfers found tax-
able have involved instances where the beneficiaries necessalily had to
survive the grantor to take under the trust. Central Hanover Bank
v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 497 (1944) (life income to.grantor; corpus,
at his death, to children and issue) ; Comm'r v. Bayne, 155 F.2d 475 (2d
Cir. 1946) (same); Leaman v. Comm'r, 5 T. C. 699 (1945) (same);Bank of California v. Conim'r, 155 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1946) (same);Beach v. Busey, 156 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1946) (income to grantor's wife
for life, to be split between daughter and wife at his death; corpus
according to descent statutes at death of survivor. Here the remainder-
men must survive the survivor of the daughter and wife, who in turn
must survive the grantor). In those cases denying tax liability, it was
only.possible, and not necessary, that the beneficiaries would have to
survive the grantor to take their estates. Lasker's Estate v. Comm'r,
141 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1944) (property to children for life, remainder
at their death to certain beneficiaries); Fifth Ave. Bank of N.Y. v.
Comm'r, 59 F. Supp. 753 (1945) (income to daughter and grandson forlife, trust to terminate at death of survivor); Estate of Houghton v.
Comm'r, 2 T. C. 871 (1943) (income to life beneficiaries, remainder
to descendants surviving the life beneficiaries); Goodyear v. Comm'r,
2 T. C. 885 (1943) (income to son for life, remainder to brothers,
children, or issue); Lloyd's Estate v. Comm'r, 141 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.1944) (income to son with power of appointment; corpus to beneficiaries,
one-half at the age of thirty, balance at thirty-five) ; Comm'r v. Kellogg,
119 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1944) (life income to grantor, then to his wife;
corpus, upon death of survivor, to beneficiaries); Estate of Harris
Falnestock, 4 T. C. 1096 (1945) (life income to child; corpus, at child'sdeath, to issue). Marion v. Glenn, 79 F. Supp. 96 (1948) appears to
be the only case where the court has imposed the estate tax where it
was not necessary that the beneficiary survive the grantor to takehis estate. It is important to note that none of the decisions are
predicated upon the survivorship test, but the holdings rely upon re-
tention of interest by the grantor, in which area they are inconsistent.Under this view, the courts have necessarily had more difficulty in
finding a taxable interest where the grantor has reserved a life estate,because of the May v. Heiner ruling. It is only in this phase that there
have resulted rulings which are inconsistent under the survivorship
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ent inconsistency arises only when one thinks solely in terms
of the second qualification. But there are indications that
the government position is that the only survivorship requis-
ite is that inherent in this second qualification.20 If this is
to be the future government contention, it has received
strong support from the expansive language used by the
majority in the Spiegel case.
Under either approach, however, it is now clear that
in some instances the court will look to state law in deter-
mining the taxability of decedent's estates under § 811 (c).
This introduces undesirable complexity since, at the election
of the estate,21 the federal tax scheme may be snarled by
forty-eight interpretations of one retained interest.
22
qualification. Gamble v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 114 (1946) ; Estate
of Nina M. Campanari, 5 T. C. 488 (1945); Estate of Harold I. Pratt,
5 T. C. 881 (1945) ; Estate of Sallie Houston Henry, 4 T. C. 423 (1944) ;
United States v. Brown, 134 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1943). But even the
courts finding a taxable interest under § 811 (c) in similar fact situa-
tions find the interest, not in the life estate, but in the possible rever-
sion. The overruling of May v. Heiner should alleviate this difficulty.
To the effect that survivorship should be the sole test of taxability
see Nelson, Reverters in Estate Taxation, 23 TAxES 98 (1945).
20. See PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, p. 194 (1946
Supp.) where the Government brief in the Fidelity-Philadelphia case is
reviewed, and it is concluded that, under this argument, virtually any
trust would be taxable. And see Eisenstein, The Hailock Problem: A
Case Study in Administration, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1148 (1945).
21. Should the estate fear an adverse determination in the federal
courts, Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, suggests that the estate may
petition the state court for a declaratory judgment, or some similar
decree. But the effectiveness of this alternative is severely limited as
there is no assurance of its availability or the binding effect of such
a decree. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides that such
relief is discretionary and that the court may refuse to render a decree
where such would not terminate the controversy giving rise to the pro-
ceeding. And the federal courts have refused to be bound by state
court declarations amounting to consent decrees. United States v. Mit-
chell, 74 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1944); First-Mechanics National Bank of
Trenton v. Comm'r, 117 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1940). There has been no
standard laid down for the determination of what constitutes a consent
decree, but it has been suggested that the taxpayer should establish
four propositions: (1) substantial opposition, (2) oral arguments or
briefs, (3) serious attention to the pertinent issue, (4) necessity for
the determination of the particular issue. Calm, Local Law In Fed-
eral Taxation, 52 YALE L. J. 799 (1943). Thus, a heavy burden is
placed upon the estate and access to the state courts may not be
readily available.
22. As to the desirability of uniformity generally, see Cahn,
Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L. J. 799 (1943). In Helver-
ing v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 117 (1940), Justice Frankfurter de-
clared: "There are great diversities among the several states as to
the conveying significance of like grants; . . . the importation of
these distinctions and controversies from the law of property into
the administration of the estate tax precludes a fair and workable
system."
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Also inherent in the inclusion of implied reversions with-
in the statute is the continued dependence of tax liability
upon property law; a dependency that frequently has been
criticized.23 So long as retention-of-interest is argued, tax-
ability will be subjected to the "unwitty diversities of prop-
erty law." For this disturbing situation, however, the Court
must accept full responsibility, because it forced the Govern-
ment to this contention. But the elimination of this judicial
doctrine would require overruling of earlier decisions, a
course which was apparently considered and rejected by the
Court on reargument of the Spiegel case.24
While the applicable theory of taxation under § 811 (c)
still appears elusive, Spiegel has raised problems of estate
planning which are of more immediate concern. From this
aspect the case is merely another in a long line of cases im-
posing an ever higher premium on draftsmanship. The same
plan of distribution may be adopted by the grantor, but he
must be more careful to rid himself of any possible interest,
as by providing for an eventual remainder to charity or the
state.25 The alteration of existing trusts to meet the require-
ments imposed by Spiegel is of even more pressing im-
portance. Suggested solutions are necessarily speculative,
but several merit consideration. The grantor may revoke the
trust and resettle it,26 or he may release his reversionary in-
terest.2 7  Such attempts to avoid tax may be regarded as
23. Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231, 234 (1931): "Nothing
is to be gained by multiplying words in respect of various niceties of
the art of conveyancing or the law of contingent and vested re-
mainders." And in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 112 (1940):
"It . . . [Klein decision] . . . refused to subordinate the plain purposes
of a modern fiscal measure to the wholly unrelated origins of the re-
condite learning of ancient property law." See Ray, The Estate Tax
on Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at
or After Death: Helvering v. Hallock, 29 GEORGETOWN L. J. 943 (1941),
where the overruling of Shukert v. Allen is advocated along with the
deletion or presumption of "intent" as used in § 811(c). Shukert v.
Allen presents a problem not within the scope of this discussion. See
note 2, supra.
24. Sup. Ct. Journal, June 21, 1948, pp. 296-8.
25. See Comm'r v. Lasker, 141 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1944); Comm'r
v. Kellogg, 119 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1944); Estate of Hall, 3 T. C. M. 1264
(1944). In these cases the grantor provided for a final remainder to
his next of kin, which was held sufficient to defeat any reversionary
interest in the grantor.
26. The trust may be revoked with the consent of all beneficiaries
and then resettled by the grantor. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §§ 337, 338.
Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93 (1935).
27. See Griswold, Powers of Appointment Under the Revenue Act
of 1942, 56 HARV. L. REV. '742 (1943). The complications arising in the
area of transfer of powers of appointment indicate that the attempted
release of reversions may be a dangerous course.
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transfers in contemplation of death,28 but there is precedent
to the effect that a release will be regarded as a part of the
original transaction and judged as of the date of the earlier
transfer.2 9 A sale of the reversion is an additional possible
solution and an. examination of the cases indicates that such
a sale is more feasible than might be expected. 30 These al-
terations should be applied as well to trusts which are un-
like the Spiegel instrument in that, under their provisions,
the beneficiaries need not necessarly survive the grantor
to take their estates. The fate of such trusts is left in doubt
by the Spiegel decision because the applicability of the first
qualification of the treasury regulation was not disputed.
Relief should not be expected from future regulations
since the Commissioner has announced that the Spiegel de-
cision has not rendered necessary any change in Treasury
Regulation 105, § 81.17.31 State legislatures, however, have al-
ready taken action to protect their citizens from the tax con-
sequences of the decision. 32 In view of the very probable exis-
tence of other less complex solutions, it may be doubted that
such action is either helpful or necessary.2
28. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794 (2d Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 648 (1939). In cases where urgent action
must be taken to avert the Spiegel consequences, the factors weighing
in favor of the grantor, such as age and health, will not be present to
refute the presumption created by the presence of the tax evasion
motive.
29. Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326 U. S. 630, 636 (1946). Cf.
Commr v. Hofheimer Estate, 149 F.2d 7Z3 (2d Cir. 1945).
30. The Spiegel trust, for example, was in excess of one million
dollars; yet Spiegel's reversionary interest, computed by actuarial tables,
was worth approximately $70 at his death. To the effect that possi-
bilities of reverter are generally alienable, see 2 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY§ 159 (a). Such a sale, if bona fide, would avoid the contemplation of
death problem.
31. Prentice-Hall Weekly Letter on Taxation and Government Reg-
ulation, April 25, 1949.
32. Minnesota has passed a statute providing that, if by the term
of the trust the grantor shows an intention to irrevocably divest himself
of all interest in the trust property, no reversionary interest shall arise
in him or his estate, but the state shall stand in his place. L. 1949, c.
201.
33. State legislation raised the problem of statutory construction
by state courts; so the state law problem becomes increasingly difficult.
For example unoer the Minnesota statute, there still remains the prob-
lem: Has the grantor shown an intention to divest himself of all
interest?
A constitutional question is also posed by the Minnesota statute,
which is applicable to trusts executed prior to enactment as well as
those subsequently executed: Is the grantor being deprived of his
property (reversionary interest) without due process of law where he
executed his trust prior to the enactment of the statute?
19491
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The Spiegel decision is a further step in a trend requir-
ing the grantor to specifically incorporate his intent into the
terms of the conveying instrument if he is to avoid the con-
sequences of the statute. Where the grantor desires to make
an absolute inter vivos conveyance of his property he will
find no legal obstruction. Where such an intention is not so
clearly entertained by the grantor, the terms of the convey-
ing instrument necessarily will be more vague. It is just
this situation which § 811 (c) portends to cover and extreme
cases serve only as a warning for more cautious drafting.
